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Advisories specifically aimed at industrial control systems — from CISA ICS-CERT and directly from vendors (including Siemens, ABB, Schneider Electric, WAGO and Phoenix Contact) — including revision history (initial publication, Update A, Update B) and linked CVEs.

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Advisory data: live connection— last retrieved: 7 November 2026 at 22:36.

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SEVD-2026-104-03

Use of Hard-coded Credentials vulnerability on Easergy MiCOM Px40 Series

Schneider Electric — Easergy MiCOM

Schneider Electric CPCERTmiddel

Published

14 April 2026

Last update

12 May 2026

Linked CVEs

Affected sectors

Risk evaluation

Schneider Electric is aware of a vulnerability in its Easergy MiCOM Px40 Series products. The [Easergy MiCOM Px40](https://www.se.com/ww/en/product-subcategory/4725-easergy-micom-px40-series/?filter=business-6-medium-voltage-distribution-and-grid-automation) is a protection relay series for Medium Voltage, High Voltage and Extra High Voltage protection. Failure to apply the mitigations provided below may risk unauthorized exposure of basic device identification through the SNMP protocol.

Mitigation summary

For customers who do not require SNMP Contact Schneider Electric's [Customer Care Center](https://www.se.com/ww/en/work/support/contacts.jsp) to upgrade the Firmware to a version without SNMP functionality. If customers choose not to apply the upgrade provided above, they should immediately apply the following mitigations to reduce the risk of exploit: * Use relays only in a protected network environment, * Use firewalls to protect and separate the control system network from other networks, * Use VPN (Virtual Private Networks) tunnels if remote access is required. For customers who require SNMP Please immediately apply the following mitigations to reduce the risk of exploit: * Use relays only in a protected network environment, * Use firewalls to protect and separate the control system network from other networks, * Use VPN (Virtual Private Networks) tunnels if remote access is required.

Revision history (2)
  1. Initial publication — 14 April 2026

    Original Release

  2. Update A — 12 May 2026

    Updated the risk associated with successful exploitation of this vulnerability and revised the remediation table to a mitigation table to emphasize that multiple mitigation options are available.

Official source: Schneider Electric CPCERT