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ICS Advisories

Advisories specifically aimed at industrial control systems — from CISA ICS-CERT and directly from vendors (including Siemens, ABB, Schneider Electric, WAGO and Phoenix Contact) — including revision history (initial publication, Update A, Update B) and linked CVEs.

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Advisory data: live connection— last retrieved: 7 November 2026 at 01:34.

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VDE-2020-004

WAGO: e!Cockpit cleartext communication and hardcoded key

WAGO — TP600

WAGO PSIRThigh

Published

9 March 2020

Last update

14 May 2025

Affected sectors

Risk evaluation

The communication between e!Cockpit and the programmable logic controller is not encrypted. The broken cryptographic algorithm allows an attacker to decode the password for the e!Cockpit communication and with this to manipulate the application. The password used by e!Cockpit for authentication against the PLC is encrypted with a hard-coded key. An attacker is able to decrypt the password by listening to the network traffic.

Mitigation summary

* Follow the instructions in WAGO's handbook Cyber Security for Controller * Restrict network access to the device. * Do not directly connect the device to the internet * Use an encrypted VPN connection to the device * Disable unused TCP/UDP-ports Typically the e!Cockpit communication is only needed during commissioning of the programmable logic controller and not during normal operations. WAGO highly recommends disabling the TCP Port 11740 and UDP Port 1740 after commissioning or using an encrypted VPN connection to the device.

Revision history (3)
  1. Initial publication — 9 March 2020

    initial revision

  2. Update A — 10 April 2025

    Fixed namespace URL

  3. Update B — 14 May 2025

    Fix: added distribution

Official source: WAGO PSIRT