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CVE-2025-39682
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tls: fix handling of zero-length records on the rx_list Each recvmsg() call must process either - only contiguous DATA records (any number of them) - one non-DATA record If the next record has different type than what has already been processed we break out of the main processing loop. If the record has already been decrypted (which may be the case for TLS 1.3 where we don't know type until decryption) we queue the pending record to the rx_list. Next recvmsg() will pick it up from there. Queuing the skb to rx_list after zero-copy decrypt is not possible, since in that case we decrypted directly to the user space buffer, and we don't have an skb to queue (darg.skb points to the ciphertext skb for access to metadata like length). Only data records are allowed zero-copy, and we break the processing loop after each non-data record. So we should never zero-copy and then find out that the record type has changed. The corner case we missed is when the initial record comes from rx_list, and it's zero length.
This record: live connection— last retrieved: 20 November 2026 at 19:46.
Vendor
Published
5 September 2025
Last modified
19 October 2026
Taken directly from NVD, CISA or the vendor — sometimes in English, unchanged from the source.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tls: fix handling of zero-length records on the rx_list Each recvmsg() call must process either - only contiguous DATA records (any number of them) - one non-DATA record If the next record has different type than what has already been processed we break out of the main processing loop. If the record has already been decrypted (which may be the case for TLS 1.3 where we don't know type until decryption) we queue the pending record to the rx_list. Next recvmsg() will pick it up from there. Queuing the skb to rx_list after zero-copy decrypt is not possible, since in that case we decrypted directly to the user space buffer, and we don't have an skb to queue (darg.skb points to the ciphertext skb for access to metadata like length). Only data records are allowed zero-copy, and we break the processing loop after each non-data record. So we should never zero-copy and then find out that the record type has changed. The corner case we missed is when the initial record comes from rx_list, and it's zero length.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Attack vector
NETWORK
Privileges required
NONE
User interaction
NONE
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High
Probability of exploitation within 30 days
3.3%
Percentile
89e
Source: FIRST.org, updated on 20 November 2026.
Fixed upstream in Linux kernel 6.6.103. For the EDGE500IP the fix is backported in COMTRAXX firmware 5.1.1.
Our own interpretation and context for the source data above.
IACS Radar assessment
Our own interpretation and context for this vulnerability — not an official source.
IACS Radar priority score
Based on CVSS 9.8, EPSS 3.3%, industrial relevance 50/100; raised due to confirmed active exploitation (KEV).
Combines CVSS, EPSS, KEV status, industrial relevance and exposure relevance — a complement to, not a replacement for, the individual scores below and above.
Conditions for exploitation
Operational impact & energy relevance
Possible loss of visibility of or control over the process upon successful exploitation.
No strong energy-sector-specific signals recognised; general OT/ICS relevance.
Additional mitigations
Recommended defensive measures
Industrial relevance score
Classification is provisional; manual verification by an OT security analyst is recommended.
Classified by IACS Radar-analysepijplijn (geautomatiseerd) on 20 November 2026.
IEC 62443 mapping
Automatic IACS Radar assessment based on the reported CWE weakness classification; not an official certification statement.