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CVE-2026-23368
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: phy: register phy led_triggers during probe to avoid AB-BA deadlock There is an AB-BA deadlock when both LEDS_TRIGGER_NETDEV and LED_TRIGGER_PHY are enabled: [ 1362.049207] [<8054e4b8>] led_trigger_register+0x5c/0x1fc <-- Trying to get lock "triggers_list_lock" via down_write(&triggers_list_lock); [ 1362.054536] [<80662830>] phy_led_triggers_register+0xd0/0x234 [ 1362.060329] [<8065e200>] phy_attach_direct+0x33c/0x40c [ 1362.065489] [<80651fc4>] phylink_fwnode_phy_connect+0x15c/0x23c [ 1362.071480] [<8066ee18>] mtk_open+0x7c/0xba0 [ 1362.075849] [<806d714c>] __dev_open+0x280/0x2b0 [ 1362.080384] [<806d7668>] __dev_change_flags+0x244/0x24c [ 1362.085598] [<806d7698>] dev_change_flags+0x28/0x78 [ 1362.090528] [<807150e4>] dev_ioctl+0x4c0/0x654 <-- Hold lock "rtnl_mutex" by calling rtnl_lock(); [ 1362.094985] [<80694360>] sock_ioctl+0x2f4/0x4e0 [ 1362.099567] [<802e9c4c>] sys_ioctl+0x32c/0xd8c [ 1362.104022] [<80014504>] syscall_common+0x34/0x58 Here LED_TRIGGER_PHY is registering LED triggers during phy_attach while holding RTNL and then taking triggers_list_lock. [ 1362.191101] [<806c2640>] register_netdevice_notifier+0x60/0x168 <-- Trying to get lock "rtnl_mutex" via rtnl_lock(); [ 1362.197073] [<805504ac>] netdev_trig_activate+0x194/0x1e4 [ 1362.202490] [<8054e28c>] led_trigger_set+0x1d4/0x360 <-- Hold lock "triggers_list_lock" by down_read(&triggers_list_lock); [ 1362.207511] [<8054eb38>] led_trigger_write+0xd8/0x14c [ 1362.212566] [<80381d98>] sysfs_kf_bin_write+0x80/0xbc [ 1362.217688] [<8037fcd8>] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x17c/0x28c [ 1362.223174] [<802cbd70>] vfs_write+0x21c/0x3c4 [ 1362.227712] [<802cc0c4>] ksys_write+0x78/0x12c [ 1362.232164] [<80014504>] syscall_common+0x34/0x58 Here LEDS_TRIGGER_NETDEV is being enabled on an LED. It first takes triggers_list_lock and then RTNL. A classical AB-BA deadlock. phy_led_triggers_registers() does not require the RTNL, it does not make any calls into the network stack which require protection. There is also no requirement the PHY has been attached to a MAC, the triggers only make use of phydev state. This allows the call to phy_led_triggers_registers() to be placed elsewhere. PHY probe() and release() don't hold RTNL, so solving the AB-BA deadlock.
This record: live connection— last retrieved: 24 September 2026 at 05:12.
Taken directly from NVD, CISA or the vendor — sometimes in English, unchanged from the source.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: phy: register phy led_triggers during probe to avoid AB-BA deadlock There is an AB-BA deadlock when both LEDS_TRIGGER_NETDEV and LED_TRIGGER_PHY are enabled: [ 1362.049207] [<8054e4b8>] led_trigger_register+0x5c/0x1fc <-- Trying to get lock "triggers_list_lock" via down_write(&triggers_list_lock); [ 1362.054536] [<80662830>] phy_led_triggers_register+0xd0/0x234 [ 1362.060329] [<8065e200>] phy_attach_direct+0x33c/0x40c [ 1362.065489] [<80651fc4>] phylink_fwnode_phy_connect+0x15c/0x23c [ 1362.071480] [<8066ee18>] mtk_open+0x7c/0xba0 [ 1362.075849] [<806d714c>] __dev_open+0x280/0x2b0 [ 1362.080384] [<806d7668>] __dev_change_flags+0x244/0x24c [ 1362.085598] [<806d7698>] dev_change_flags+0x28/0x78 [ 1362.090528] [<807150e4>] dev_ioctl+0x4c0/0x654 <-- Hold lock "rtnl_mutex" by calling rtnl_lock(); [ 1362.094985] [<80694360>] sock_ioctl+0x2f4/0x4e0 [ 1362.099567] [<802e9c4c>] sys_ioctl+0x32c/0xd8c [ 1362.104022] [<80014504>] syscall_common+0x34/0x58 Here LED_TRIGGER_PHY is registering LED triggers during phy_attach while holding RTNL and then taking triggers_list_lock. [ 1362.191101] [<806c2640>] register_netdevice_notifier+0x60/0x168 <-- Trying to get lock "rtnl_mutex" via rtnl_lock(); [ 1362.197073] [<805504ac>] netdev_trig_activate+0x194/0x1e4 [ 1362.202490] [<8054e28c>] led_trigger_set+0x1d4/0x360 <-- Hold lock "triggers_list_lock" by down_read(&triggers_list_lock); [ 1362.207511] [<8054eb38>] led_trigger_write+0xd8/0x14c [ 1362.212566] [<80381d98>] sysfs_kf_bin_write+0x80/0xbc [ 1362.217688] [<8037fcd8>] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x17c/0x28c [ 1362.223174] [<802cbd70>] vfs_write+0x21c/0x3c4 [ 1362.227712] [<802cc0c4>] ksys_write+0x78/0x12c [ 1362.232164] [<80014504>] syscall_common+0x34/0x58 Here LEDS_TRIGGER_NETDEV is being enabled on an LED. It first takes triggers_list_lock and then RTNL. A classical AB-BA deadlock. phy_led_triggers_registers() does not require the RTNL, it does not make any calls into the network stack which require protection. There is also no requirement the PHY has been attached to a MAC, the triggers only make use of phydev state. This allows the call to phy_led_triggers_registers() to be placed elsewhere. PHY probe() and release() don't hold RTNL, so solving the AB-BA deadlock.
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Attack vector
LOCAL
Privileges required
LOW
User interaction
NONE
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
None
Availability
High
Probability of exploitation within 30 days
0.1%
Percentile
1e
Source: FIRST.org, updated on 23 September 2026.
Limit access to the interactive shell of the additional GNU/Linux subssytem to trusted personnel only.
Our own interpretation and context for the source data above.
IACS Radar assessment
Our own interpretation and context for this vulnerability — not an official source.
IACS Radar priority score
Based on CVSS 5.5, EPSS 0.1%, industrial relevance 55/100.
Combines CVSS, EPSS, KEV status, industrial relevance and exposure relevance — a complement to, not a replacement for, the individual scores below and above.
Conditions for exploitation
Operational impact & energy relevance
Possible loss of visibility of or control over the process upon successful exploitation.
Assessed as relevant to the energy sector based on: Vermeld in een officiële CISA ICS Advisory, wat directe relevantie voor industriële besturingssystemen bevestigt. Vendor "Siemens" is a known supplier of equipment for the energy sector.
Recommended defensive measures
Industrial relevance score
Classification is provisional; manual verification by an OT security analyst is recommended.
Classified by IACS Radar-analysepijplijn (geautomatiseerd) on 24 September 2026.
IEC 62443 mapping
Automatic IACS Radar assessment based on the reported CWE weakness classification; not an official certification statement.