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CVE-2026-43492
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: lib/crypto: mpi: Fix integer underflow in mpi_read_raw_from_sgl() Yiming reports an integer underflow in mpi_read_raw_from_sgl() when subtracting "lzeros" from the unsigned "nbytes". For this to happen, the scatterlist "sgl" needs to occupy more bytes than the "nbytes" parameter and the first "nbytes + 1" bytes of the scatterlist must be zero. Under these conditions, the while loop iterating over the scatterlist will count more zeroes than "nbytes", subtract the number of zeroes from "nbytes" and cause the underflow. When commit 2d4d1eea540b ("lib/mpi: Add mpi sgl helpers") originally introduced the bug, it couldn't be triggered because all callers of mpi_read_raw_from_sgl() passed a scatterlist whose length was equal to "nbytes". However since commit 63ba4d67594a ("KEYS: asymmetric: Use new crypto interface without scatterlists"), the underflow can now actually be triggered. When invoking a KEYCTL_PKEY_ENCRYPT system call with a larger "out_len" than "in_len" and filling the "in" buffer with zeroes, crypto_akcipher_sync_prep() will create an all-zero scatterlist used for both the "src" and "dst" member of struct akcipher_request and thereby fulfil the conditions to trigger the bug: sys_keyctl() keyctl_pkey_e_d_s() asymmetric_key_eds_op() software_key_eds_op() crypto_akcipher_sync_encrypt() crypto_akcipher_sync_prep() crypto_akcipher_encrypt() rsa_enc() mpi_read_raw_from_sgl() To the user this will be visible as a DoS as the kernel spins forever, causing soft lockup splats as a side effect. Fix it.
This record: live connection— last retrieved: 24 September 2026 at 05:13.
Taken directly from NVD, CISA or the vendor — sometimes in English, unchanged from the source.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: lib/crypto: mpi: Fix integer underflow in mpi_read_raw_from_sgl() Yiming reports an integer underflow in mpi_read_raw_from_sgl() when subtracting "lzeros" from the unsigned "nbytes". For this to happen, the scatterlist "sgl" needs to occupy more bytes than the "nbytes" parameter and the first "nbytes + 1" bytes of the scatterlist must be zero. Under these conditions, the while loop iterating over the scatterlist will count more zeroes than "nbytes", subtract the number of zeroes from "nbytes" and cause the underflow. When commit 2d4d1eea540b ("lib/mpi: Add mpi sgl helpers") originally introduced the bug, it couldn't be triggered because all callers of mpi_read_raw_from_sgl() passed a scatterlist whose length was equal to "nbytes". However since commit 63ba4d67594a ("KEYS: asymmetric: Use new crypto interface without scatterlists"), the underflow can now actually be triggered. When invoking a KEYCTL_PKEY_ENCRYPT system call with a larger "out_len" than "in_len" and filling the "in" buffer with zeroes, crypto_akcipher_sync_prep() will create an all-zero scatterlist used for both the "src" and "dst" member of struct akcipher_request and thereby fulfil the conditions to trigger the bug: sys_keyctl() keyctl_pkey_e_d_s() asymmetric_key_eds_op() software_key_eds_op() crypto_akcipher_sync_encrypt() crypto_akcipher_sync_prep() crypto_akcipher_encrypt() rsa_enc() mpi_read_raw_from_sgl() To the user this will be visible as a DoS as the kernel spins forever, causing soft lockup splats as a side effect. Fix it.
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Attack vector
LOCAL
Privileges required
LOW
User interaction
NONE
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
None
Availability
High
Probability of exploitation within 30 days
0.2%
Percentile
5e
Source: FIRST.org, updated on 23 September 2026.
Limit access to the interactive shell of the additional GNU/Linux subssytem to trusted personnel only.
Our own interpretation and context for the source data above.
IACS Radar assessment
Our own interpretation and context for this vulnerability — not an official source.
IACS Radar priority score
Based on CVSS 5.5, EPSS 0.2%, industrial relevance 55/100.
Combines CVSS, EPSS, KEV status, industrial relevance and exposure relevance — a complement to, not a replacement for, the individual scores below and above.
Conditions for exploitation
Operational impact & energy relevance
Possible loss of visibility of or control over the process upon successful exploitation.
Assessed as relevant to the energy sector based on: Vermeld in een officiële CISA ICS Advisory, wat directe relevantie voor industriële besturingssystemen bevestigt. Vendor "Siemens" is a known supplier of equipment for the energy sector.
Recommended defensive measures
Industrial relevance score
Classification is provisional; manual verification by an OT security analyst is recommended.
Classified by IACS Radar-analysepijplijn (geautomatiseerd) on 24 September 2026.
IEC 62443 mapping
Automatic IACS Radar assessment based on the reported CWE weakness classification; not an official certification statement.