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CVE-2017-13077
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA and WPA2) allows reinstallation of the Pairwise Transient Key (PTK) Temporal Key (TK) during the four-way handshake, allowing an attacker within radio range to replay, decrypt, or spoof frames.
This record: live connection— last retrieved: 7 November 2026 at 02:35.
Vendor
Products
Promag, Promass, Spare Transmitter for Promass, Spare Transmitter for Promag, Spare Display for Promag, Spare Display for Promass 300 and 1 more
up to version <=01.01.02
Published
17 October 2017
Last modified
17 June 2026
Taken directly from NVD, CISA or the vendor — sometimes in English, unchanged from the source.
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA and WPA2) allows reinstallation of the Pairwise Transient Key (PTK) Temporal Key (TK) during the four-way handshake, allowing an attacker within radio range to replay, decrypt, or spoof frames.
CVSS:3.0/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Attack vector
NETWORK
Privileges required
NONE
User interaction
NONE
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
None
Probability of exploitation within 30 days
2.4%
Percentile
84e
Source: FIRST.org, updated on 6 November 2026.
If an immediate firmware update is not possible, the WLAN on the unit can also be switched off as a precautionary measure.
Our own interpretation and context for the source data above.
IACS Radar assessment
Our own interpretation and context for this vulnerability — not an official source.
IACS Radar priority score
Based on CVSS 6.8, EPSS 2.4%, industrial relevance 40/100.
Combines CVSS, EPSS, KEV status, industrial relevance and exposure relevance — a complement to, not a replacement for, the individual scores below and above.
Conditions for exploitation
Operational impact & energy relevance
Limited impact on availability; the risk lies mainly with confidentiality or integrity of process data.
No strong energy-sector-specific signals recognised; general OT/ICS relevance.
Recommended defensive measures
Industrial relevance score
Classification is provisional; manual verification by an OT security analyst is recommended.
Classified by IACS Radar-analysepijplijn (geautomatiseerd) on 7 November 2026.
IEC 62443 mapping
Automatic IACS Radar assessment based on the reported CWE weakness classification; not an official certification statement.