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CVE-2017-13080
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA and WPA2) allows reinstallation of the Group Temporal Key (GTK) during the group key handshake, allowing an attacker within radio range to replay frames from access points to clients.
This record: live connection— last retrieved: 7 November 2026 at 02:35.
Vendor
Products
Promag, Promass, Spare Transmitter for Promass, Spare Transmitter for Promag, Spare Display for Promag, Spare Display for Promass 300 and 1 more
up to version <=01.01.02
Published
17 October 2017
Last modified
17 June 2026
Taken directly from NVD, CISA or the vendor — sometimes in English, unchanged from the source.
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA and WPA2) allows reinstallation of the Group Temporal Key (GTK) during the group key handshake, allowing an attacker within radio range to replay frames from access points to clients.
CVSS:3.0/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
Attack vector
NETWORK
Privileges required
NONE
User interaction
NONE
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
High
Availability
None
Probability of exploitation within 30 days
2.3%
Percentile
83e
Source: FIRST.org, updated on 6 November 2026.
If an immediate firmware update is not possible, the WLAN on the unit can also be switched off as a precautionary measure.
Our own interpretation and context for the source data above.
IACS Radar assessment
Our own interpretation and context for this vulnerability — not an official source.
IACS Radar priority score
Based on CVSS 5.3, EPSS 2.3%, industrial relevance 40/100.
Combines CVSS, EPSS, KEV status, industrial relevance and exposure relevance — a complement to, not a replacement for, the individual scores below and above.
Conditions for exploitation
Operational impact & energy relevance
Limited impact on availability; the risk lies mainly with confidentiality or integrity of process data.
No strong energy-sector-specific signals recognised; general OT/ICS relevance.
Recommended defensive measures
Industrial relevance score
Classification is provisional; manual verification by an OT security analyst is recommended.
Classified by IACS Radar-analysepijplijn (geautomatiseerd) on 7 November 2026.
IEC 62443 mapping
Automatic IACS Radar assessment based on the reported CWE weakness classification; not an official certification statement.