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VDE-2021-048
Lenze: Multiple Vulnerabilities in CODESYS Control V2 communication
Gepubliceerd
4 oktober 2021
Laatste update
4 oktober 2021
Gekoppelde CVE's
Getroffen sectoren
Risk evaluation
The affected products contain a CODESYS Control runtime system in version V2. They are therefore affected by the vulnerability described in CODESYS Advisory 2021-06. It provides a communication server for the communication with clients like the CODESYS Development System. The 9400 servo inverters is only affected if the communication Path via the inserted EtherNet Module E94AYCEN on slot MXI1 or MXI2 is used. If the Module E94AYCEN is used, the following Versions are affected. Product Identification: E94xSHxxx (Single Drive, High Line) Product Identification: E94xMHxxx (Multi Drive, High Line) Remark: If the product identification of your 9400 product does not fit to the above mentioned identification, please contact Lenze at Security.de@Lenze.com. The Versions P (power supply module) and R (regenerative power supply module) are not affected. Furthermore, the Variant P (PLC) and the Variant S (StateLine) are not affected. The communication paths via the diagnostic interface X6, the system bus (CAN) X1 or the field buses (other than the named Ethernet module) that can be plugged into the module slots MXI1 or MXI2 are not affected. The focus is therefore on 9400 servo inverters with the product-identification E94x{S/M}{H}... with a plugged in Ethernet module E94AYCEN... in module slot MXI1 or MXI2 and communication with the Engineer-Tools via exactly this channel. In addition to the standard tool Engineer, there is also a special Version of the PLC Designer (Version 0.x). The communication path to the PLC Designer is not considered with the planned update and the vulnerabilities here remain even after the update. Here, the customer must provide a secure Environment, see Mitigation.
Mitigatiesamenvatting
As part of a security strategy, Lenze SE recommends the following general defense measures to reduce the risk of exploits: - Only use the products in a protected and controlled environment to minimize network impact and to ensure that they are inaccessible from outside. - Use firewalls to protect the automation system network and to separate it from other networks. Remark: One Measure should be to Block port 1200 via the firewall and open this port for authenticated access only. - Use Virtual Private Networks (VPN) tunnels when remote access is required. - Use IDS (Intrusion Detection Systems) where possible to detect anomalies in the network. - Activate and use user administration and password functions. - Use encrypted communication links. Restrict access to both the development tools and their projects and the products of the automation system by physical means, operating system functions, etc. - Protect the development tool by using the latest virus detection solutions.
Revisiegeschiedenis (1)
Initiële publicatie — 4 oktober 2021
Initial revision.