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CVE-2024-50164
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Fix overloading of MEM_UNINIT's meaning Lonial reported an issue in the BPF verifier where check_mem_size_reg() has the following code: if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) /* For unprivileged variable accesses, disable raw * mode so that the program is required to * initialize all the memory that the helper could * just partially fill up. */ meta = NULL; This means that writes are not checked when the register containing the size of the passed buffer has not a fixed size. Through this bug, a BPF program can write to a map which is marked as read-only, for example, .rodata global maps. The problem is that MEM_UNINIT's initial meaning that "the passed buffer to the BPF helper does not need to be initialized" which was added back in commit 435faee1aae9 ("bpf, verifier: add ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK type") got overloaded over time with "the passed buffer is being written to". The problem however is that checks such as the above which were added later via 06c1c049721a ("bpf: allow helpers access to variable memory") set meta to NULL in order force the user to always initialize the passed buffer to the helper. Due to the current double meaning of MEM_UNINIT, this bypasses verifier write checks to the memory (not boundary checks though) and only assumes the latter memory is read instead. Fix this by reverting MEM_UNINIT back to its original meaning, and having MEM_WRITE as an annotation to BPF helpers in order to then trigger the BPF verifier checks for writing to memory. Some notes: check_arg_pair_ok() ensures that for ARG_CONST_SIZE{,_OR_ZERO} we can access fn->arg_type[arg - 1] since it must contain a preceding ARG_PTR_TO_MEM. For check_mem_reg() the meta argument can be removed altogether since we do check both BPF_READ and BPF_WRITE. Same for the equivalent check_kfunc_mem_size_reg().
Dit record: live koppeling— laatst opgehaald: 24 september 2026 om 04:11.
Rechtstreeks overgenomen uit NVD, CISA of de leverancier — soms Engelstalig, ongewijzigd t.o.v. de bron.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Fix overloading of MEM_UNINIT's meaning Lonial reported an issue in the BPF verifier where check_mem_size_reg() has the following code: if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) /* For unprivileged variable accesses, disable raw * mode so that the program is required to * initialize all the memory that the helper could * just partially fill up. */ meta = NULL; This means that writes are not checked when the register containing the size of the passed buffer has not a fixed size. Through this bug, a BPF program can write to a map which is marked as read-only, for example, .rodata global maps. The problem is that MEM_UNINIT's initial meaning that "the passed buffer to the BPF helper does not need to be initialized" which was added back in commit 435faee1aae9 ("bpf, verifier: add ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK type") got overloaded over time with "the passed buffer is being written to". The problem however is that checks such as the above which were added later via 06c1c049721a ("bpf: allow helpers access to variable memory") set meta to NULL in order force the user to always initialize the passed buffer to the helper. Due to the current double meaning of MEM_UNINIT, this bypasses verifier write checks to the memory (not boundary checks though) and only assumes the latter memory is read instead. Fix this by reverting MEM_UNINIT back to its original meaning, and having MEM_WRITE as an annotation to BPF helpers in order to then trigger the BPF verifier checks for writing to memory. Some notes: check_arg_pair_ok() ensures that for ARG_CONST_SIZE{,_OR_ZERO} we can access fn->arg_type[arg - 1] since it must contain a preceding ARG_PTR_TO_MEM. For check_mem_reg() the meta argument can be removed altogether since we do check both BPF_READ and BPF_WRITE. Same for the equivalent check_kfunc_mem_size_reg().
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Attack vector
LOCAL
Privileges required
LOW
User interaction
NONE
Vertrouwelijkheid
Hoog
Integriteit
Hoog
Beschikbaarheid
Hoog
Kans op misbruik binnen 30 dagen
0.2%
Percentiel
12e
Bron: FIRST.org, bijgewerkt op 23 september 2026.
Limit access to the interactive shell of the additional GNU/Linux subssytem to trusted personnel only.
Onze eigen Nederlandstalige interpretatie en context bij de brondata hierboven.
IACS Radar-duiding
Onze eigen interpretatie en context bij deze kwetsbaarheid — geen officiële bron.
IACS Radar-prioriteringsscore
Gebaseerd op CVSS 7.8, EPSS 0.2%, industriële relevantie 55/100.
Weegt CVSS, EPSS, KEV-status, industriële relevantie en exposure-relevantie samen — een aanvulling op, geen vervanging van, de losse scores hieronder en hierboven.
Voorwaarden voor misbruik
Operationele impact & energierelevantie
Mogelijk verlies van zicht op of besturing over het proces bij succesvol misbruik.
Beoordeeld als relevant voor de energiesector op basis van: Vermeld in een officiële CISA ICS Advisory, wat directe relevantie voor industriële besturingssystemen bevestigt. Leverancier "Siemens" is een bekende leverancier van apparatuur voor de energiesector.
Aanbevolen defensieve maatregelen
Industriële relevantiescore
Classificatie is voorlopig; handmatige verificatie door een OT-securityanalist wordt aanbevolen.
Geclassificeerd door IACS Radar-analysepijplijn (geautomatiseerd) op 24 september 2026.
IEC 62443-mapping
Automatische IACS Radar-duiding op basis van de gerapporteerde CWE-zwakteclassificatie; geen officiële certificeringsuitspraak.